A practical community-based response strategy to interrupt Ebola transmission in sierra Leone, 2014–2015 by unknown
RESEARCH ARTICLE Open Access
A practical community-based response
strategy to interrupt Ebola transmission in
sierra Leone, 2014–2015
Zhong-Jie Li1†, Wen-Xiao Tu2†, Xiao-Chun Wang3†, Guo-Qing Shi4†, Zun-Dong Yin5†, Hai-Jun Su6, Tao Shen4,
Da-Peng Zhang3, Jian-Dong Li7, Shan Lv8, Chun-Li Cao8, Rui-Qian Xie9, Hong-Zhou Lu10, Rong-Meng Jiang11,
Zheng Cao12, Zhi-Jie An5, Lei-Lei Li2, Jie Xu3, Yan-Wen Xiong13, Wei Zang8, Wei Zhang14, Hong-Wei Zhang15,
Wen-Sen Chen16, Hua Ling17, Wen Xu18, Jian Cai19, Huan-Jin Luo20, Xue-Sheng Xing21, Can-Jun Zheng1,
Qiang Wei22, Xin-Xu Li23, Mei Li8, Hai Jiang13, Li-Quan Deng24, Ming-Quan Chen25, Xiang Huo26, Feng Xu27,
Xue-Hui Lai28, Xi-Chen Bai29, Long-Jie Ye12, Jian-Yi Yao2, Wen-Wu Yin1, Jiao-Jin Sun5, Lin Xiao30, Fu-Qiang Liu31,
Xiao-Qiang Liu18, Hong-Wei Fan32, Zeng-Qiang Kou33, Ji-Kun Zhou34, Hao Zhang12, Da-Xin Ni2, Thomas T. Samba35,
Qun Li2, Hong-Jie Yu1, Yu Wang1,36* and Xiao-Feng Liang1,36*
Abstract
Background: The Ebola virus disease spread rapidly in West Africa in 2014, leading to the loss of thousands of lives.
Community engagement was one of the key strategies to interrupt Ebola transmission, and practical community
level measures needed to be explored in the field and tailored to the specific context of communities.
Methods: First, community-level education on Ebola virus disease (EVD) prevention was launched for the community’s
social mobilizers in six districts in Sierra Leone beginning in November 2014. Then, from January to May of 2015, in
three pilot communities, local trained community members were organized to engage in implementation of EVD
prevention and transmission interruption measures, by involving them in alert case report, contact tracing, and social
mobilization. The epidemiological indicators of transmission interruption in three study communities were evaluated.
Results: A total of 6 016 community social mobilizers from 185 wards were trained by holding 279 workshops in the
six districts, and EVD message reached an estimated 631 680 residents. In three pilot communities, 72 EVD alert cases
were reported, with 70.8 % of them detected by trained local community members, and 14 EVD cases were finally
identified. Contact tracing detected 64.3 % of EVD cases. The median duration of community infectivity for the cases
was 1 day. The secondary attack rate was 4.2 %, and no third generation of infection was triggered. No health worker
was infected, and no unsafe burial and noncompliance to EVD control measures were recorded. The community-based
measures were modeled to reduce 77 EVD cases, and the EVD-free goal was achieved four months earlier in study
communities than whole country of Sierra Leone.
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Conclusions: The community-based strategy of social mobilization and community engagement was effective in case
detection and reducing the extent of Ebola transmission in a country with weak health system. The successfully
practical experience to reduce the risk of Ebola transmission in the community with poor resources would potentially
be helpful for the global community to fight against the EVD and the other diseases in the future.
Keywords: Ebola virus disease, Community engagement, Health education, Outbreak control
Multilingual abstracts
Please see Additional file 1 for translation of the
abstract into six official working languages of the
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Background
The Ebola virus disease (EVD) is one of the most serious
viral diseases currently known, with a high case-fatality
rate around 50 % (20–90 %), and there is no specific
treatment and no licensed Ebola vaccines [1]. The EVD
outbreak in the western African countries in 2014, in all
its unprecedented dimensions, severity and complexity,
has become an emergency of international concern and
a global public health crisis [2, 3]. The country of Sierra
Leone was severely impacted by the outbreak, experien-
cing 14 122 EVD cases and 3 955 deaths as of 7 November
2015, when World Health Organization (WHO) declared
that Ebola virus transmission had been stopped in Sierra
Leone [4]. In Sierra Leone, the proportion of literacy
among people aged 15 and above was 44 % in 2012, and
there were only 0.02 physicians per 1 000 people in 2010
[5]. Lack of knowledge about disease transmission and a
weak public health infrastructure contributed to the
spread in this country [5–7].
The Ebola virus is transmitted to people from wild ani-
mals and spreads in the human population through
human-to-human transmission via direct contact with
the blood, secretions, organs or other bodily fluids of in-
fected people, and with surfaces and materials contami-
nated with these fluids [8]. The EVD epidemic in 2014
was marked by intense urban transmission, widely
spreading in the community, and multiple outbreaks in
health care facilities [9]. To interrupt the Ebola trans-
mission chain between persons, timely case detection
and rapid isolation of infected persons is necessary [10,
11]. In Sierra Leone, much of the general technical guid-
ance on response to EVD was developed and imple-
mented under the guidance of WHO [12, 13]. However,
the operational implementation to interrupt disease
transmission at the community level needed to be ex-
plored in the field and tailored to the specific context of
communities in Sierra Leone to ensure that the response
measures were performed thoroughly and effectively.
Beginning in November 2014, the Chinese public
health experts in Sierra Leone, in cooperation with local
partners, launched a comprehensive community-based
response strategy to interrupt Ebola transmission in the
community. This report describes the implementation of
this strategy and its impact on Ebola transmission inter-
ruption in the pilot communities.
Methods
The community-based response strategy in Sierra Leone
consisted of two parts (see Additional file 2: Appendix
File S1): the first was to conduct widespread community
education on EVD prevention at the community level in
the six districts; And the second one was to carry out
field-operational intensified control measures at commu-
nity level to interrupt the Ebola transmission in three
pilot communities, by involving the local community
members to participate in the implementation of EVD
surveillance and response action in their respective
settings.
Widespread community education in six districts
In Sierra Leone, there are a total of 14 districts and 394
wards (the smallest administrational level), with a popu-
lation of about 6 million nationwide. As required by the
Ministry of Health and Sanitation of Sierra Leone
(MOHS-SL), the 6 districts most seriously affected by
EVD were selected to perform community education for
community social mobilizers. These districts included
Western Area Urban, Western Area Rural, Port Loko,
Bombali, Tonkolili and Moyamba, which have a total
population of nearly 3.5 million. People involved in
social mobilization in these communities, including
community and religious leaders, community activists,
primary health-care workers, and volunteers, were se-
lected to be trained. The workshop mainly included
messages on EVD, infection prevention in the commu-
nity, and skills needed for social mobilization, which are
in accordance with the EVD health messages from
WHO [7]. Trainees were asked to promise to distribute
the messages of EVD prevention to their community
members via face-to-face communicating, or distribute
posters and brochures, and they were provided with a
health package containing some posters, brochures, one
thermometer, soap, hand sanitizer and T-shirt with EVD
message. Some of the trainees were sampled conveni-
ently to survey their understanding of the EVD messages
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and their follow-up social mobilization activities in their
communities.
Intensified field measures in three pilot communities
Pilot sites selection
From January 13 to May 19, 2015, an intensified field
operational EVD response program was performed in
three pilot communities with high risk of Ebola trans-
mission. The Jui, Kossoh town, and Grafton communi-
ties in the Western Area Rural District which are
located in the south-eastern part of the capital city,
Freetown, were selected as the field sites, as they are
near one of the EVD treatment center and one Ebola
testing laboratory. These three communities have a com-
bined area of about 10 km2, with about 9000 households
and 40 thousands of inhabitants.
Community response team recruitment and deployment
The community and religious leaders and activists in the
pilot communities who had a high school or higher edu-
cation level or had some health educational background
were recruited and trained to form the local community
response team. All the team members came from the
three pilot communities, who are familiar with the per-
sons and environment of the community. For the three
communities combined, this response team included 60
social mobilizers, 5 disease surveillance officers (DSO),
18 contact tracers, and 3 support staff. All the field work
in the three pilot communities was supervised by 5 ex-
perienced senior supervisors and 5 field supervisors
from the Western Area District Health Management
Team. In addition, 2 senior coordinators and 3 commu-
nity coordinators were enrolled to facilitate the EVD re-
sponse from the community level to the district and
national levels. All the recruited community team mem-
bers were systematically trained on their roles and how
to implement their task in the community.
A “sector” approach, which divided the three pilot
communities into a total of 30 subsections with on
average 1.3 thousand of population for each subsection,
was taken to ensure that all the community households
and residents were fully covered by the community re-
sponse team. The recruited social mobilization, contact
tracers, DSO, and field supervising were sub-grouped to
be fixed on the 30 corresponding designated subsections
(Additional file 2: Appendix File S2 Table S2_1).
Operational response mechanism in the community
In accordance with the national guidelines issued by
WHO and MOHS-SL, [3] the field-operational proposal
on intensified surveillance and response of EVD was fur-
ther tailored for the community level, and the corre-
sponding EVD case definitions on alert case, suspected
case, probable case, confirmed case, non-case and case
contact were determined (see Additional file 2: Appen-
dix File S2). The critical components of the response to
Ebola transmission in the community, including case de-
tection, verification and investigation, contact tracing
and case isolation, are demonstrated in the operational
workflow figure (Fig. 1).
Four active detection routes on EVD alert cases were
established in the community, including contact tracing,
house-to-house visits, health facility reports, and com-
munity reports. Each EVD alert case would be promptly
investigated by the DSO. Once verified as a suspected
case, the case would then be isolated and treated in the
Ebola holding center (EHC). Furthermore, if the case’s
biological specimen was positive for Ebola virus, this
confirmed case would then be treated in the Ebola
Treating Center (ETC).
Once a suspected EVD case was identified, any person
who met the definition of being a contact to this sus-
pected case would be identified through contact tracing
and registered as a contact. Once the suspected case was
identified as a probable or confirmed EVD case, the
listed contact persons were monitored daily on health
status by the designated community contact tracer team
for 21 consecutive days after their last contact with the
EVD case.
Fig. 1 Field-operational workflow of EVD case detection, investigation
and management in three pilot communities, Sierra Leone
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Social mobilization and community engagement were
advocated in the community. Each social mobilization
team was required to conduct daily house-to-house
screening and to distribute posters and leaflets contain-
ing key EVD messages to the households in their com-
munities, and to observe the community compliance to
the response measures. In addition, billboards and ban-
ners on EVD prevention and case reporting were set up
in the community.
Data collection
The data on investigation of EVD cases and contacts
were recorded into the relevant forms by a community
response team, and each of which was then required to
submit the data to the community coordinator on a daily
basis. The key epidemiological indicators of Ebola trans-
mission interruption in the whole country of Sierra
Leone including proportion of new confirmed cases
from registered contacts, community infectivity time,
proportion of confirmed EVD died in the community,
unsafe burials for probable or confirmed EVD case, and
community compliance were obtained from the weekly
situation report by WHO [3].
Data analysis
The case fatality rate was calculated as the percentage of
fatal EVD cases among the probable or confirmed cases
with a known definitive clinical outcome. The interval
from symptom onset to hospitalization in EHC or ETU
was considered to be community infectivity time. The
secondary EVD case denoted the person who was diag-
nosed as EVD, after having contact with the primary
EVD case within the incubation period. Secondary attack
rate was calculated by taking the number of secondary
EVD cases among the contacts divided by the number of
contact persons.
The key epidemiological indicators of Ebola transmis-
sion interruption were compared between the three pilot
communities and the whole country of Sierra Leone,
from January 13 to April 5, 2015. The duration and size
of the EVD outbreak in the three pilot communities
where the intensified response strategy was imple-
mented were compared with simulated duration and
size for the same geographic area under the assump-
tion of no intensified response strategy being
implemented. This was done by applying the EVD
Response modeling tool developed by United States
Center for Disease Control and Prevention, which is a
susceptible, incubation, infectious and recovery (SIIR)
Model to estimate the number of EVD cases in a
community [14]. The details on the methods and pa-
rameters of the simulation model are presented in the
Additional file 2: Appendix File S3.
Results
Outcome of widespread community-based training
From November 13, 2014 to February 5, 2015, 42 Chin-
ese public health experts in Sierra Leone held 279 work-
shops and trained 6 016 community social mobilizers
from all 185 wards in the targeted six districts, which
accounted for 47.0 % of all the 394 wards nationwide
(Fig. 2). Among the 207 participants in this workshop
that were surveyed, 96 % of them were able to demon-
strate complete understanding of the message of EVD
prevention in the community. Among 380 trainees sur-
veyed by telephone one month after being trained,
51.1 % had actively participated in social mobilization
and health education activities, and on average, each
trainee disseminated the EVD messages to 105 other
community members. As a result, an estimated 631 680
community members received EVD prevention messages
in the community from the 6 016 trained social
mobilizers.
EVD case detection and contact tracing in the community
During the intensified response period from January 13
to May 19, 2015 in three communities, a total of 72
EVD alert cases were reported, and the last alert case
was reported on May 2, 2015 (Fig. 3a); Among these
alert cases, 14 EVD cases, including 1 probable and 13
confirmed EVD cases, were further identified, with the
final one emerging on March 14 (Fig. 3b). A cumulative
total of 607 contacts had been registered and placed
under quarantine during the pilot period, and the last
contact person finished the 21-day follow up on April 6
(Fig. 3c). House to house visits by social mobilization
team generated the largest number of alert cases, ac-
counting for 70.8 % (51/72) of all alert cases, but only
one alert case detected from this source was finally iden-
tified as a confirmed case. Contact tracing identified 14
alert cases, which accounted for 19 % (14/72) of the total
alert cases; of these, 9 were confirmed EVD cases identi-
fied during this period. Community reports triggered 6
alert cases, and detected three confirmed cases and one
probable case. Health facilities only reported one alert
case, which was negative for Ebola (Fig. 3d).
Community transmission of EVD cases
Among the 14 EVD cases, the median age was 26.5 years
(range, 3–55 years), and 6 (46 %) were male. The major
occupations of EVD cases included petty trader (4 cases)
and student (3 cases), with no EVD case identified
among the health care workers. The most common
symptoms among the 12 cases with clinical information
collected, included fever (83 %), vomiting or nausea
(75 %), anorexia (58 %), conjunctivitis (50 %), muscle
pain (50 %), joint pain (50 %), and only 1 case (8 %) pre-
sented with unexplained bleeding. The median interval
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from last contact with the EVD cases to onset of illness
was 8 days (range, 4–18 days). Among the 8 death EVD
cases (case fatality rate of 57.1 %), 7 died in an ETU and
1 case died at home; All were buried in a safe manner.
The median interval from onset of illness to death was
4 days (range, 1–7).
Among the 14 EVD cases, 7 cases were detected in
Jui community, 6 cases reported in Kossoh Town
community, with only 1 case in Grafton community
(Fig. 4). Three cases (C4, C8 and C9) were imported
cases infected with EVD outside of their local com-
munity, and the other 11 cases were infected in their
local community. Detailed information on epidemio-
logical relationship is provided in Additional file 2:
Appendix File S4.
Two clusters of EVD cases were identified, with the
one cluster (6 cases) occurring in Jui community, and
the other one (6 cases) in Kossoh Town community
(Fig. 4). Among the 215 contact persons, 9 secondary
cases were identified, with an overall secondary attack
rate of 4 · 2 %; no third generation of case was generated.
All nine secondary cases had a history of exposure to an
infected person who died, either on the date of death or
one day prior to death. In contrast, among all the 170
contacts exposed to the two alive cases (C4 and C9), no
one EVD case was detected. Among the 9 secondary
EVD cases, 8 cases were the family member of the in-
fector and were identified from the contact persons be-
ing monitored; and only 1 case (C2, neighbor of the
infector) was reported by local health team via house to
house visit, who visited C1 secretly and was not re-
corded on the contacts list.
Evaluation on transmission interruption in the community
The proportion of new confirmed cases detected from
the registered contacts in the three communities
(64.3 %) was higher than the proportion nationwide
(45.6 %) (Table 1). The community infectivity time in
three communities was 1.0 day (range, 0–14 days),
which is shorter than that of nationwide (1.9 days). The
proportion of confirmed EVD deaths in the community
was 12.5 % (1/8), which is much less than the overall
national statistics (21.2 %). No unsafe burial or non-
compliance with EVD control measures were ob-
served by the community response team in the three
pilot communities.
Assuming that the key epidemiological indicators of
transmission interruption in the three pilot communities
were the same as those nationwide during the period of
January 13, 2015 to July 17, 2015, it is estimated by the
model that there would have been 91 (range from 17 to
2 205) EVD cases occurring in the pilot communities,
which was 77 cases more than what was observed (14
cases). Under these assumptions, the zero-EVD goal
would not have been achieved until July 17, 2015, a delay
of more than 4 months from what was observed in the
pilot communities (Fig. 5).
Fig. 2 The geographic distribution of community education in six districts and the field intensified response action in three pilot communities
against EVD in Sierra Leone, from November 9th, 2014 to May 19th, 2015
Li et al. Infectious Diseases of Poverty  (2016) 5:74 Page 5 of 10
Discussion
In this study, we found that community-based education
for the local residents with face to face communication,
especially for the influential community persons was an
effective means of widely disseminating EVD prevention
messages to members of EVD-affected communities. By
conducting intensified response measures in the three
pilot communities, EVD alert cases were detected in a
timely manner, and the community infectivity time of
EVD cases was shortened. All the key epidemiological
indicators of transmission interruption in the pilot
communities were better than that calculated nationwide
in Sierra Leone. The enhanced measures were estimated
to reduce the expected number of EVD cases by 77, and
the EVD-free goal was achieved much earlier in the pilot
community.
In the West African EVD epidemic, in absence of an
effective EVD vaccine, community-based risk reduction
measures were among the best ways to interrupt Ebola
transmission and can be effective even in areas with
weak health infrastructure [15, 16]. It is reported in
several studies that community education and social
mobilization could facilitate public awareness and
improve the compliance of community members with
prevention and control measures in their communities
[15–17]. In our experience, the means of widespread
community education should be tailored to the context
of the community level. Firstly, a training of trainer
model was proposed to train the 40 local trainers by
Chinese public health experts in English language, and
then the local trainers began to train the community
members face to face with simple words and local lan-
guage, which ensure that education messages was easily
understood by the participants from the community.
Secondly, we invited the district medical officer to coord-
inate and enroll the participants via the local community
network, and also provided the transportation fees and
one free lunch meal for each participant, which propa-
gated the workshop messages to reach the marginal
groups in the remote rural areas. Furthermore, some of
the posters, leaflets, and banners with simple and under-
standable key messages on EVD prevention were distrib-
uted to each trainee, and they used them to communicate
the EVD information in their communities.
Fig. 3 Time series of EVD alert cases, probable and confirmed cases, and contact persons by week and the initial detection source of alert cases
and probable and confirmed cases from January 13 to May 19, 2015, in three communities, Sierra Leone. (a EVD alert cases; b EVD probable and
confirmed cases; c EVD contact persons under tracing; d the initial detection source of EVD alert, probable and confirmed cases.)
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Fig. 4 Transmission tree of EVD cases and the timeline of two community clusters in Jui, Kossoh town, and Grafton community, Sierra Leone,
from January 13 to May 19, 2015. Panel A: Transmission tree for the EVD cases in three communities of Sierra Leone, January 13-May 19, 2015. In
this transmission tree diagram, EVD cases are identified by sequential numbers in each small circle based on date of onset, and labeled
with the occupation (source of case detection, amount of contact persons for each case). NA-not available for occupation of C8. On the
abbreviation of the source of case detection: T-contact tracing, C-community report, H-house to house visit. Each EVD cases (small circle)
is followed by a period of community infectivity time (dotted line); time from date of hospitalization in ETU isolation or safe burial to
onset of the next generation case (black arrow); and time from date of hospitalization in ETU or safe burial to final outcome (solid black
line), D-died, R-recovered. Panel B: Timeline of exposure history, clinical and control procedure for two cluster of EVD cases in Jui commu-
nity (Panel B1) and in Kossoh Town community (Panel B2). The abbreviation: E-last exposure to probable or confirmed EVD cases; O-onset
of illness; R-case report; S-specimen collection; I-case investigation; H-hospitalization in ETU; C-Being identified as probable or confirmed
EVD case; D-died; Re-recovery; NA-not available
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In Sierra Leone, the lack of well-trained, professional
public health staff presented a great challenge to the goal
of implementing Ebola virus control measures [5, 7]. In
our experience in the three pilot communities, we used
the national response strategy and technical guidance
established by WHO and other organizations and helped
adapt it to fit the local context by training and support-
ing the community response teams, who were then the
most motivated and skilled at applying it in their own
communities. Our practice demonstrated that local com-
munity members, with proper educational background,
could be recruited and trained to effectively conduct the
intensified measure of case detection, investigation,
reporting, and contact tracing in their local community
under the supervision of experienced professionals from
the local public health institute, and contribute to the
final achievement of zero-EVD goal. This approach has
also been successfully practiced in certain rural areas of
Liberia by WHO and US CDC [18, 19]. The way of
motivating the community members to engage in EVD
control measures in their community provided a feasible
solution to overcome the challenges of lack of public
health human resources in the community.
This study revealed features of the occurrence and
transmission of EVD cases in the community which
should be addressed to reach the EVD-free goal. First,
travelers moving across the community could introduce
the EVD from one to the other community. There were
three imported EVD cases detected in the pilot commu-
nities and one of them triggered five secondary cases.
Travelers potentially have a longer community infective
time after getting Ebola infection because they are
commonly harder to monitor [20, 21]. This finding has
also been reported in Liberia, where travelers led to re-
introduction of EVD in the local EVD-free community
[22, 23]. Second, no EVD cases were found among the
Table 1 Comparison of epidemiological indicators of transmission interruption between the three pilot communities and the whole
country of Sierra Leone, from January 13 to April 5, 2015a
Indicators Nationwideb Three pilot communities
Proportion of new confirmed cases from registered contacts % (no. new confirmed cases/
all registered contacts)
45.6 (302/662) 64.3 (9/14)
The median of community infectivity time (range)-days 1.9 1.0 (0–14)
Proportion of confirmed EVD died in the community % (no. EVD cases died in the
community/all EVD death cases)
21.2 (156/736) 12.5 (1/8)
Amount of unsafe burials for probable or confirmed EVD case 173 0
Number of districts with at least one security incident or other form of incompliance
to EVD control measure (no. per week)
2.7 0
aAs the last case in the three communities was isolated on March 15, 2015, and the longest incubation period of EVD was 21 days, we set the end date of
comparison period to April 5, 2015
bAll the nationwide indicators of EVD control performance for Sierra Leone were obtained and calculated from WHO situation reports. EVD: Ebola Virus Disease
Fig. 5 Modeling the number of EVD cases among the three communities, Western Area Rural District, Sierra Leone, from January 13, 2015
to July 17, 2015
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health care workers in our study, though they have been
a highly affected group since the beginning of the EVD
outbreak [24–26]. This might reflect the fact that the
infection risk among the health care facilities de-
creased with the improvement of the infection control
awareness, and better use of equipment and skills of
the health care workers. Furthermore, we found that
all nine secondary cases were either household mem-
bers or neighbors of the Ebola infector, which demon-
strated that community members living close to the
EVD case have become the most high risk group for
Ebola infection. Even in this later stage of the EVD
epidemic, we found that some sick persons would
conceal their exposure history to EVD cases and thus
delay the time for isolation, which showed the com-
plexity of Ebola transmission interruption in the
community.
This study had limitations. First, we were not able to
follow up specifically on what the trained participants
did in their community, and no systematic evaluation of
the impact of the widespread community education
action on the EVD prevention was conducted. In this
emergency situation, we were only able to select very
few of the participants of the workshop to perform a
simple assessment of their post-training understanding
of the EVD prevention messages and how many com-
munity persons they shared messages with. Second, we
were not able to evaluate the response performance in
the three pilot communities by comparing changes in
epidemiologic indicators of disease transmission before
and after the implementation of intensified measures in
the same settings, because we could not get the detailed
local epidemiological data before the study period.
However, by comparing the three heavily EVD impacted
pilot communities with the whole country in Sierra
Leone during the same period, we believe our results
support our conclusion that community level social
mobilization and community engagement were an effect-
ive strategy in the special context.
Conclusion
Our study shows that mobilization of community mem-
bers engaging in EVD prevention and transmission
interruption measures in their community can be an
effective way to reach the goal of EVD-free community,
even in the context of poor public health infrastructure
and human resources. This response strategy against
Ebola transmission in the community should be
highlighted and the field-operational guidance at the
community level should be well developed, tailored and
extended nationwide in Sierra Leone, as well as in all the
EVD-affected countries in their unique contexts, so as to
achieve the EVD-free goal.
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